We analyze the e¤ectiveness of hedge funds'high-water mark provisions (HWMs) at mitigating moral hazard and adverse selection, when the supply of capital is competitive. We show that the HWM does not allow better managers to distinguish themselves ex ante. Regarding moral hazard, we …nd that precision of beliefs about a manager's ability is crucial to the HWM's e¤ectiveness. When precision is low, the HWM encourages shirking. However, if precision is high, and the beliefs themselves are high as well, then the HWM encourages costly e¤ort by the manager. Furthermore, the HWM boosts the initial fund size, depresses initial expected returns and increases subsequent expected returns.
For an investment in a hedge fund, the investor typically pays both a base fee and an incentive fee, where the incentive fee is subject to a high-water mark provision (HWM).
The job of the HWM is to apply this fee only to net pro…ts, i.e. to suspend it until past losses are made up. Because hedge funds enjoy wide freedom in choosing their fee structures, and because they choose HWMs so frequently, it would seem that the HWM brings a bene…t. In this paper we address the economic role of the HWM, deriving its implications for assets and expected returns, and also its e¤ect on contract e¢ ciency.
Our analysis …nds signi…cant implications for assets and expected returns in both the time series and the cross section, while casting doubt on the HWM's ability to improve e¢ ciency when a manager's abilities are not already well known.
Bad fund performance is central to the analysis, as it not only triggers the HWM, but also delivers two other simultaneous e¤ects in opposite directions. One e¤ect is through learning: to the extent that investors learn about a manager from his performance, bad performance reduces his fund's prospects. The other e¤ect is through scale: to the extent that a fund's size dilutes value added per dollar, as explored by Berk and Green (2004) , bad performance improves its prospects. Accordingly, our analysis allows for all these e¤ects to play out: bad performance triggers the HWM, which in ‡uences subsequent investment, which in turn in ‡uences the expected return.
Another key element of the analysis is the HWM's disparate treatment of the investors within a hedge fund. Among mutual funds, by the Berk and Green (2004) analysis, investors equalize prospects with their reactions to past returns. This equalization hinges on a fund's entering investments being treated the same as its incumbent investments: when the expected return of new money reaches zero, the expected return of incumbent money reaches zero too. But a HWM disrupts this logic, because while an investment that makes a loss pays no incentive fee unless and until that loss is made up, any new investment has no losses to make up, so its expected incentive fee is higher, and expected return is lower. So when new money after a loss drives its expected return to zero, the expected return on incumbent investment is positive. To a prospective investor, this means the HWM creates the possibility of a future above-market expected return that can come only after a negative return. It is this possibility that we …nd to be key to the HWM's e¤ect on the cross section and time series of returns, on fund size and on the manager's e¤ort.
For some intuition on size and expected returns, consider managers A and B, who have the same expected value-added, i.e. alpha, but A's alpha is known with complete precision, whereas there is considerable uncertainty about B's. So the e¤ect of a bad return on A's fund is just the positive scale e¤ect, whereas the e¤ect on B includes both the positive scale and the negative learning e¤ect. Suppose this negative e¤ect is strong enough that incumbent investors' expected returns are negative, even with the HWM and the scale e¤ect, after a bad return. Then B's investors will have to withdraw funds just to bring their expectations to zero, through the scale e¤ect. New money would not enter, since its expectation would be lower, and therefore negative. By contrast, A's fund will attract new investment after bad performance, as it is a depleted fund with unchanged prospects, so new investors re…ll it until their expected return hits zero.
Because incumbent investors pay no incentive fee while under the high-water mark, the return expectations of incumbent money are above zero even after the entrance of new money. If the initial return had instead been positive, this possibility of a positive expected return would not exist for any investors, because without losses, new and incumbent money have the same HWM, so new money drives all expectations to zero.
Backing up to the original investments with A and B, only the investors with A place positive probability on a positive future expected return, so only A's investors compete their initial expected return below zero through additional investment. Thus, the HWM alters expected returns only when investors are relatively certain of the manager's ability, since that is when it delivers a positive expectation after bad performance and shelters this expectation from dilution by new money.
Regarding e¢ ciency, we ask whether the HWM helps solve two standard moneymanagement agency problems: adverse selection and moral hazard. Managers privately know, in the model, whether they are skilled or unskilled, where the skilled add more value, and only if they make a privately costly e¤ort. Thus, we can address whether the HWM reduces adverse selection by screening the unskilled managers out. We …nd it does not. We can also address whether the HWM reduces moral hazard by increasing the maximum e¤ort cost that the skilled manager will pay. We …nd that the HWM can increase this cost, but only when the incidence of skilled managers is high, maybe implausibly high.
We can get some intuition for the moral hazard result from the example with managers A and B. Because his investors'expected return after a bad performance is zero, it follows that the manager with the imprecisely-known alpha, manager B, gets all the expected surplus after bad performance. But whereas this compensation would arrive through both a base and an incentive fee without a HWM, with the HWM it arrives through just the base fee. So the HWM lowers expected incentive pay without touching expected compensation, thereby reducing the reward to e¤ort after a bad return. After a good return it has no e¤ect, so the net e¤ect is simply negative. By contrast, the HWM gives A's investors positive expected returns after bad performance, thereby reducing the manager's expected surplus after bad performance. This punishment raises the possibility that the HWM increases the reward to e¤ort by such managers, who in practice could be the managers with longer track records. We …nd that this can indeed happen, but it is potentially important that the HWM also reduces the reward for a good initial return, due to the larger base fee that arises from the larger initial investment, and that reduces the net pro…ts the incentive fee is applied to.
Our analysis of the e¢ ciency of the HWM contributes to a literature that to date has explored hedge-fund contracts through the analysis of an initial investment which may eventually leave. This literature has focused particular attention on the manager's incentive to add risk. Standard option-pricing results suggest that the base/incentive fee structure encourages risk taking, but a series of papers analyzing the risk choice from di¤erent perspectives (Hodder and The analysis most related to ours may be Aragon and Qian (2010), which asks from another perspective how the HWM can improve e¢ ciency. If investors can learn from and leave after a period of performance, the HWM, they show, discourages costly liquidation by bringing the expected fee in line with the fund's reduced prospects.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 1 presents the model and some preliminary results. Section 2 addresses the e¢ ciency of the HWM and Section 3 relates the model to empirical …ndings as well as discusses the regions when the HWM helps to improve moral hazard problems. Finally, Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
I. Model

A. The Setup
There are three dates, 0, 1 and 2, with the …rst period running from 0 to 1 and the second from 1 to 2. A money manager can manage in both periods, and in each period his dollar return is either or , which we refer to as a high or low return, respectively. 1 1 We capture decreasing returns to scale by assuming that the manager adds a …xed amount of expected value, so that extra investment spreads this expectation across more dollars. See Berk and The manager has no money, and there are arbitrarily many competitive investors who have money they can invest with the manager at both dates 0 and 1. Everybody is risk-neutral, 2 discounts at zero and has a reservation utility and expected return of zero.
The manager could be a good type (G) or a bad type (B). Let 2 (0; 1) stand for the probability that the manager is type G. A manager knows his type but investors share this common prior. A type G can invest in his trading strategy and improve his chances of success in both periods at a cost c > 0 at date 0 whereas a type B cannot improve his chances of success. The manager will have a high return with probability 2 (0; 1) if he is type G and makes the costly e¤ort. Otherwise, the probability of high return is < , where 2 (0; 1). 3 We assume that it is e¢ cient to invest in the trading strategy, i.e. to make the costly e¤ort, which amounts to assuming that
The …rst part of the inequality ensures that the expected payo¤ di¤erence between making and not making the costly e¤ort is higher than the cost of e¤ort. The second inequality ensures that the expected payo¤ of the good type is positive net of the costly e¤ort.
We denote the amount invested with the manager at date t as I t . The money management contract is exogenously speci…ed as a base fee of x > 0 paid at the beginning of a period and an incentive fee y > 0 of net pro…ts paid at the end of the period, where the incentive fee may have a HWM. Thus at date 0 the manager gets a base fee of xI 0 , and at date 1 the manager gets y( xI 0 ) if the …rst-period return was high, and nothing if the …rst-period return was low. 4 that any …rst-period losses su¤ered by an account must be made up in the second before the incentive fee can be charged to that account. This does not apply to any new date 1 investment in the fund, which will have a fresh HWM and thus pay the incentive fee on positive net pro…ts.. If investment is added to the fund at date 1, the new investment and old investment share in the fund's pre-incentive-fee return in proportion to their invested amounts, and then pay incentive fees out of their take. If investors remove a fraction of their investment before rolling over, the HWM on the remaining investment goes down by the same fraction. All second-period investment pays the base fee x at date 1.
The timing of the game is as follows. We use perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) as our equilibrium concept with a focus on e¢ cient equilibria, i.e., equilibria where type G makes the e¤ort and every valueincreasing manager manages funds in both periods.
B. Equilibrium
We start by characterizing the equilibrium set in which e¢ cient e¤ort and management occur. By assumption, e¤ort by type G is e¢ cient, and e¤ort by type B has no e¤ect.
Whether it is e¢ cient for B to manage at all depends on : if 1 2 , then it is …rst best e¢ cient to have both types manage in both periods, but if < 1 2
, then it is only e¢ cient if only type G manages. However, the following result shows that it is not possible to achieve …rst best e¢ ciency when < To economize on the exposition, it is useful to introduce some more notation for the further analysis of the pooling equilibirum. After the …rst period's return, investors update their prior probability that the manager is type G. Let H and L be the updated probabilities after a high and low return, respectively. From Bayes' rule we
. Similarly, investors update their prior probability that the manager will attain the high return. Let 0 stand for the manager's unconditional probability of a high return, i.e. 0 = + (1 ) ; the probabilities after a high and low return are, respectively,
It is also convenient to refer to the investment in the fund at the end of the …rst period as the fund's incumbent investment, and any money added to the fund for the second period as the fund's new investment. Next, we …rst characterize the solution without the HWM, and then with the HWM. This allows us to analyze the impact of HWM.
C. The No-HWM case
Without a HWM, incumbent and new investment invest on the same terms for the second period, so the Berk and Green (2004) logic applies. It is immediate that their secondperiod expected returns must be the same, and it also follows that this expectation must be zero. To see that it is zero, note that no investor has anything to gain from accepting a negative expectation, since the second period is the last, and also that if the expectation were positive, new investment would be pro…table until it pushed the expectation to zero. This logic applies whether the …rst-period return is high or low.
From the zero second-period expectation it follows that the …rst-period expected return is also zero. That is, there is no reason to accept a negative expectation, since the second-period expectation for incumbent investment is certain to be zero, and if the expectaton were positive, investment would enter until the expecation hit zero. Thus, without a HWM, expected returns are zero in all states.
Since expected returns are zero, the fund's assets at the start of each period must be at the level that delivers this expectation. In other words, investment must be at the point where, from the investors'perspective, expected compensation to the manager equals the manager's expected value-added. In the notation developed above, the expected compensation, the base fee plus the expected incentive fee, given investment I, is xI + y 0 ( xI) (note that the incentive fee applies to pro…ts net of the base fee), and the manager's expected value-added is 0 + (1 0 )( ) = (2 0 1). Thus, investment at date 0 is
Analogously, assets at date 1 after a high …rst-period return and after a low …rst-period return are, respectively,
since the same break-even logic applies. We assume throughout the paper that we are in the parameter region where these quantities are always positive, which, given that L is the worst case, amounts to
Net fund ‡ows between the two dates are simply the changes dictated by these quantities, and they are in the same or di¤erent direction as the …rst-period return, depending on the magnitude of updating, i.e. the distance between 0 and H or L . If the di¤erence is su¢ ciently big that the change in break-even fund size is greater than the change in fund size due to returns and fees, then in ‡ows follow high returns and out ‡ows follow low returns. If the di¤erence is su¢ ciently small, then out ‡ows follow high and in ‡ows follow low. Since a bigger di¤erence means that performance has a bigger e¤ect on beliefs about the manager, it implies lower precision of prior beliefs. So if priors are precise enough then money ‡ows in after low returns; otherwise it ‡ows out.
D. The HWM Case
It proves to be convenient to divide the HWM case into parameter regions, depending on the direction of net ‡ows after a low …rst-period return. We de…ne three parameter regions: the out ‡ow region, where in equilibrium money ‡ows out after a low return, the in ‡ow region, where it ‡ows in after a low return, and the no- ‡ow region, where no money ‡ows in or out after a low return. This is the important division because it is after a low return that the HWM matters, and the e¤ects of the HWM are qualitatively di¤erent across these regions. The behavior of new ‡ows after a high return is not directly interesting, since in that case incumbent investment is at its high water mark, just as new investment would be, so the fund is in exactly the same situation as it is without the HWM, with a zero expected return and assets of I H 1 . We …rst o¤er some preliminary observations about the qualitative di¤erences between the equlibria in the three regions, and then we proceed to a formal solution of the model.
D.1. Preliminary Observations
The In ‡ow Region If investors'con…dence in the manager is su¢ ciently high even after a low return, then in ‡ows will partially reverse the reduction in fund size. This new investment invests on the same terms that it would invest on in the no-HWM case, because the HWM can matter only in a subsequent period, but there is no subsequent period. Consequently, it is pro…table for new investment to enter after the …rst period if incumbent investment is less than I L 1 , in which case it enters until the fund size reaches I L 1 : That is, the expected incentive fee of incumbent investment is irrelevant to the pro…tability of new investment, so it enters to the same point it would have without the HWM, which by construction is I L 1 : Thus, in the in ‡ow region after a low return, the fund's assets are I L 1 , new investment enters and earns a zero expected return, and incumbent investment, due to its better terms, stays put and earns a positive expected return.
Because the expected second-period return on incumbent investment is positive, the expected …rst-period return has to be negative in equilibrium, driven by investment in excess of I 0 . E¤ectively, the initial investment delivers both the …rst-period return and an option to roll over as an incumbent after a low return for the positive secondperiod expectation, so initial investment drives down the expected return until the two expectations o¤set. So in the in ‡ow region, initial expected returns are negative, and initial investment is greater than it is without the HWM.
The Out ‡ow Region If the expected return on incumbent investment is negative after a low …rst-period return, then it is even more negative for new investment, so new money will not enter, and some incumbent money must ‡ow out for the remaining investment to break even. So money ‡ows out, and the expected return is zero. Thus, the expected second-period return is zero no matter what, which implies that the …rst-period expected return is zero as well, since there is no reason for investors to accept anything worse.
In the out ‡ow region, initial investment in the fund is the same as without the HWM, but investment after a low return is greater. The initial investment has to be I 0 , as it is without the HWM, since that is the fund size that delivers a zero …rst-period expectation. And after a low return, the equilibrium investment must be greater than I L 1 , the investment that obtains without a HWM, because I L 1 is the fund size at which new investment just breaks even, whereas the expected return of new investment in this region is negative, as it is worse than the expectation of incumbent investment, which is 0.
The No-Flow Region The remaining possibility is that the expected return on incumbent investment is positive, but the expected return on new investment is negative.
In this case it is unpro…table to either add or subtract investment, so no money ‡ows in or out. Consequently, the expected return on incumbent investment is positive in the second period after a bad return, and the expected …rst-period return is negative. From the analysis of the other regions, it follows that the fund is larger than in the no-HWM case both initially and after a low return.
D.2. Solving the Model
We solve the model by identifying the boundaries between the parameter regions, and for each region, calculating expected returns and fund sizes in both periods. The boundaries between the regions are discovered by comparing three quantities: the break-even initial fund size with no HWM, de…ned as I 0 above; the break-even initial fund size with a HWM but without in ‡ows or withdrawals after a bad initial return, which we denote I S 0 ; and the initial fund size such that the investor breaks even after a bad return, without in ‡ows or withdrawals at date 1, assuming no HWM. Since I L 1 is by construction the break-even fund size after a bad return, assuming no HWM, it follows that this …nal quantity is
. The functional form of I S 0 is the solution to the equation
which rearranges to
The following propositions identify the parameter regions and the expected returns and investment levels in those regions, which we distinguish from the no-HWM case by adding a hat. That is, the HWM analogs to I 0 , I Expected …rst-period pro…ts are not tenable in equilibrium, so b I 0 must be at least
I 0 , then incumbent investors must face expected losses if they leave all their money in after a bad return, because they will have invested at least I S 0 in the …rst period, and investing I S 0 implies …rst-period expected pro…ts and thus expected losses from leaving money put after a bad return. Expected second-period losses are not tenable in equilibrium, so they will take money out until they break even. Since they break even in the second period, they must break even in the …rst as well.
Proposition 3 We are in the in ‡ow region if and only if
. In this region, the expected return in the …rst period is negative whereas the expected secondperiod return is positive. HWM has no impact on the second-period fund size, b I 
g. In this region, the expected return in the …rst period is negative whereas the expected secondperiod return is positive. HWM leads to higher fund size both initially and in the second period following a low return,
D.3. Comparative Statics
In the no-HWM case, the relation of ‡ows to performance turns from positive to negative as precision increases. In the HWM case this is still broadly true, That is (by inspection of its functional form), I
S 0 increases with L , holding 0 constant, and therefore increases with precision, and the propositions show that I S 0 I 0 is necessary for money to ‡ow out after a bad return, and I S 0 > I 0 is necessary for money to ‡ow in. But the HWM also introduces an intermediate region with no ‡ows, and it also alters expected returns.
We can summarize the e¤ect of the HWM within each parameter region on expected returns and fund size, and by implication on net ‡ows, in a table. Here each entry is the net e¤ect of the HWM in the sense that the value under a contract without a HWM is subtracted from the value under an otherwise identical contract with a HWM. We use + and -to represent positive and negative net e¤ects, respectively, and 0 to represent no net e¤ect.
The e¤ect of the HWM varies across the regions. Since the regions depend on precision, it follows that the e¤ect of the HWM on quantities of interest depends on precision. To identify this dependence, we present a series of …gures where we hold all parameters constant except and , which we vary to hold 0 constant while increasing 0 L , i.e., decreasing precision. So in each …gure, the investors'initial prior on a high return stays …xed while, from left to right, the sensitivity of this prior to a low return increases. Figure 1 shows the e¤ect of decreasing precision on the fund's initial assets. As precision falls, the economy moves from the in ‡ow to no- ‡ow to out ‡ow regions, and assets consequently fall, leveling o¤ at the size of a fund with no HWM. So the more precisely investors know a new manager's ability, the more they invest. They consequently accept lower initial expected returns and enjoy higher expected returns after poor performance, as Figure 2 illustrates. Thus, initial expected returns decrease and fund size increases, as prior precision increases. Similarly, after a low return, both positive and zero ‡ows predict higher performance than do out ‡ows. Also, expected future returns are higher after low than after high returns, but only when prior precision is high, which is to say, only when low returns beget in ‡ows or no ‡ows, rather than out ‡ows. In taking these results to the data, it would be worth bearing in mind that it is the incumbent money, rather than incoming money, with the positive expectations. Empirical work on hedgefund returns is typically silent about which investment's return is being addressed, but this distinction is crucial.
In Aragon and Qian (2010), the HWM is shown to encourage investors to stay when they would have left. Table 1 shows that the HWM performs this duty in the no- ‡ow and out ‡ow, but not in ‡ow regions. This is illustrated in Figure 3 , which is analogous to Net ‡ows are usually discussed in percentage terms, i.e. divided by the fund's assets just before the ‡ows. Accordingly, Figure 4 divides the dollar ‡ows in Figure 3 by the relevant end-of-…rst-period assets. The notable result here is that the e¤ect of the HWM on percentage ‡ows is actually negative in the in ‡ow region, due to the in ‡ation of initial assets caused by the HWM, and that the e¤ect is non-monotonic, increasing through-the no- ‡ow region, and then decreasing again in the extreme out ‡ow region discussed above.
The HWM also has an e¤ect on ‡ows after high returns, due to the e¤ect on initial investment in Figure 1 . This e¤ect, illustrated in Figure 5 , attenuates in ‡ows of the funds where precision was higher in the …rst place.
II. E¢ ciency
We have already seen that the HWM does not address the adverse selection problem, because it does not discourage low-ability types from imitating high-ability types. The remaining question is whether the HWM addresses moral hazard, by increasing what high-ability types get from making the value-increasing e¤ort. The HWM has no e¤ect after a high return, so its e¤ect must come from the initial period, or the period subsequent to a low return. With respect to …rst-period expected fees, the HWM has no direct e¤ect but it can have an indirect e¤ect, because in the in ‡ow and no- ‡ow regions it increases the initial fund size. However, the resulting e¤ect on the incentive to make an e¤ort can only be negative, because the increased base fee comes out of the pro…ts that the incentive fee applies to and thus decreases the reward in …rst-period fees from making an e¤ort. With respect to second-period fees after a low return, the nature of the HWM's e¤ect on incentives depends on the parameter region. In the out ‡ow region, the HWM does not change expected fees to the manager, from the perspective of investors who break even with or without it; it merely shifts fees from incentive to base.
Intuitively, this shift is bad for the reward for e¤ort. In the other regions, the HWM reduces expected fees to the manager after a low return, as evidenced by incumbent investors'positive expected returns. This reduction is good for the reward for e¤ort, since it reduces the payo¤ from getting a low return in the …rst place, but there is a countervailing incentive e¤ect from the fact that this reduction comes from reducing incentive fees.
We address the e¢ ciency implications of the HWM by asking whether, for a given base and incentive fee, adding the HWM increases or decreases the maximum e¤ort cost that a type G willingly pays in equilibrium. We proceed by …rst establishing separately for the no-HWM and HWM cases that, for a given x and y, there is a cuto¤ e¤ort cost such that an equilibrium where type G makes an e¤ort exists if and only if c is below this cuto¤. We then address the e¢ ciency e¤ect of the HWM in each region by determining whether this cuto¤ is higher or lower when the HWM is added.
The constraint L > Next, we analyze the impact of adding the HWM by determining whether b c is higher than c, in which case the HWM improves e¢ ciency by increasing the highest e¤ort cost that a type G willingly pays, or if instead it is lower, in which case it reduces e¢ ciency.
It is worth noting that, as is common in complete-information games, the model admits multiple equilibria, and we select and focus on the most e¢ cient equilibria with and without the HWM. Alternatively, we could use standard re…nements such as Perfect Sequential Equilibrium, by which a contract with a HWM is a more robust equilibrium outcome if and only if it is more e¢ cient than the one without the HWM. We analyze the regions separately, starting with the In ‡ow case.
A. In ‡ow Case
In the In ‡ow case, whether or not the HWM increases e¢ ciency hinges on a simple inequality among the parameters: We can gain some of the intuition behind this result by considering the three ways the HWM a¤ects e¢ ciency in this region. Through the e¤ect of e¤ort on the chance of a good …rst-period return, the HWM brings both a cost and a bene…t. The cost arises from the extra base fee from the extra initial investment, because the extra base fee reduces the incentive fee by reducing the net pro…ts it applies to. The bene…t arises from the positive expected return of incumbent investment after a bad return, which comes out of the manager's expected compensation after a bad return, thereby increasing the manager's punishment for earning the bad return. Through the e¤ect of e¤ort on the chance of a good return after a bad return, the HWM brings only a cost, because it reduces the manager's incentive pay after a bad return. Looking at just this last e¤ect, from the perspective of a type G choosing at date 0 whether to make the e¤ort, this e¤ort raises the probability of a bad return followed by a good return by (1 ) (1 ) , which is negative if and only if + > 1. That is, making an e¤ort decreases the probability of su¤ering this cost if and only if + > 1. That the …rst cost increases with y helps explain why it raises the lower bound on + . An exact derivation of the functional form is in the proof.
One implication of this result is that the e¢ ciency of the HWM depends on the quality of the bad type. To see this, note …rst that the inequality in the proposition rearranges to > (1 )=(1 y ), which if = 1=2, i.e. the bad type's value added is simply 0, reduces to > 1=(2 y). This has to hold, because we are already
, and because > L . So in a high-precision economy where money enters after a bad return, if a bad manager adds zero value then the HWM always improves e¢ ciency. Since (1 )=(1 y ) < 1=(2 y) if and only if > 1=2, the HWM also always adds value if the bad manager adds positive value, but by the same token if < 1=2, i.e. a bad manager subtracts value, there is a parameter range,
, where the HWM reduces e¢ ciency.
B. Out ‡ow Case
In a low-precision economy where money ‡ows out ofter a bad return, the HWM always reduces e¢ ciency:
Proposition 8 In the Out ‡ow Region, for any given x 2 (0; 1) and y 2 (0; y), a high water mark contract leads to lower incentive to make costly e¤ort, i.e., b c(x; y; d = 1) < c(x; y; d = 0).
In the Out ‡ow Region, the HWM does not a¤ect …rst-period fund size, and so does not a¤ect …rst-period compensation. After a low initial return, the HWM makes the fund larger, so it increases the base fee. Therefore, a good type making an e¤ort calculates an expected gain of (1 ) times this increase, and a bad type or shirking good type calculates an expected gain of (1 ) times this increase. However, the base-fee increase accompanies an incentive-fee decrease. The good type making an e¤ort puts probability
(1 ) on this decrease, whereas the bad type and shirking good type put probability (1 ) . From the investors' point of view, the expected increase must o¤set the expected decrease, given that they break even overall, but a manager's expectation is di¤erent because he knows his type. Since
, it follows that the net e¤ect is negative for good types and positive for bad types and shirking good types. So in the Out ‡ow region the HWM makes it less attractive to incur costs to become a better money manager.
C. No- ‡ow Case
In the No-Flow Region, between the other two, the result is similar to the In ‡ow result, but the condition identifying the region where the HWM increases e¢ ciency is not as tidy: 
This expression doesn't allow much intuition. There is some resemblance to the In ‡ow result in that + 1 must be su¢ ciently large, but beyond that the model's dynamics are hard to tease out. Accordingly, the next section numerically explores when the HWM provides e¢ ciency bene…ts and outlines the empirical predictions one can take to the data.
III. Discussion
A. E¤ectiveness of the HWM
To explore the implications of Propositions 9 and 7 for e¢ ciency, we numerically evaluate the parameter regions where the HWM alleviates moral hazard. For this purpose we hold the base and incentive fees to the standard 2% and 20%, the bad manager's value added to zero (i.e. = 0:5), and the return to 100 (just to scale the problem), while varying the incidence and ability of the good manager. Figure 6 plots the three ‡ow regions, and Figure 7 shows where the HWM does or does not add value. Regarding moral hazard, we already know that the HWM makes it worse in the Out ‡ow region, and better in the In ‡ow region (provided that, as the …gures assume, the manager's value-added is zero) What Figure 7 shows us is how the No Flow region bridges the two. In this region, high improves e¢ ciency simply by moving the model closer to the In ‡ow region. The impact of is, however, more subtle. To understand its e¤ect on e¢ ciency, …rst, note that the HWM increases fund size both in the …rst period and in the second period after a bad return. The larger initial size means a larger initial base fee, which in turn means a lower initial incentive fee for a high initial return. So a higher means a higher expected loss of this …rst-period incentive fee, and note that this expected loss is linear in . If the …rst-period return is bad, in the In ‡ow region the HWM both raises the second-period base fee and eliminates the second-period incentive fee, where the base-fee gain and incentive-fee loss are realized with probabilities (1 ) and (1 ) , respectively, for the good type making an e¤ort, and probabilities (1 ) and (1 ) , respectively, for the bad type and shirking good type. Thus, the HWM's e¤ects on …rst-and second-period base fees are both disincentives for e¤ort, and both linear in , whereas the e¤ect the e¤ect on the second-period incentive fee is quadratic in . And with = 0:5, implying (1 ) = 0:25, and also > , it follows that (1 ) < 0:25, and also that increasing further lowers (1 ) , and at an increasing rate. Therefore, higher means higher incentive to make the e¤ort, as the bene…t from reducing the probability of the reduced incentive fee grows relative to the base-fee e¤ects. Figure 7 illustrates the non-linearities in the relation between e¢ ciency and and most importantly shows that only in a small region, all lying above > 0:91; does the the HWM encourage, rather than discourage, costly e¤ort. These results cast doubt on the e¤ectivenss of the high-water mark and highlights the limits of this type of contract.
B. Empirical Predictions
The comparative statics illustrated in Figures 1 through 5 are empirically testable, to the extent one can proxy for the quantity on the x-axis, the sensitivity of the manager's alpha to bad performance. As this sensitivity is essentially the imprecision of ex ante beliefs about the alpha, and since imprecision tends to decline with the quantity of data, an intuitive proxy for this quantity is the length, or more precisely, the shortness, of the manager's track record. So as the track record shortens, the model predicts the marginal Another perspective on the same …gures is that they relate not only imprecision but also ‡ows after bad performance to the quantities on the y-axes. So the prediction from Figure 2 is that, after bad performance, the marginal e¤ect of the HWM is higher returns for incumbent investment in the case of in ‡ows or zero ‡ows. In the case of out ‡ows, the HWM has no marginal e¤ect on returns. Similarly, Figures 3 and 5 show that the positive e¤ect of the HWM on assets after a bad return is greater in the case of out ‡ows than of in ‡ows or zero ‡ows, and Figure 4 shows that, after good performance, the HWM reduces net ‡ows, except in the case of out ‡ows.
Regarding e¢ ciency, the main prediction is the negative result about adverse selection, i.e. that the presence of a HWM is unrelated to the presence of skill, so the HWM has no marginal e¤ect on any measure of the manager's value-added. The moral-hazard result, i.e. that the HWM adds value only when it is highly probable that the manager is skilled, can be taken as a prediction that the HWM will be used more often when imprecision is very low.
C. Empirical Studies
The empirical literature has not tested the predictions about precision, but some other …ndings are relevant. Two recent empirical studies of hedge-fund fees, Agarwal and Ray (2012) and Deuskar, Wang, Wu, and Nguyen (2012), …nd about twice as many funds with HWMs than without, and in the cross-section, neither study …nds any relation in the cross section between the presence of HWMs and performance. This is consistent with the HWM not correlating with skill, as the model predicts, but since the model also predicts that fund size adapts to equalize performance, it would also be interesting to know if the HWM is unrelated to fund size.
More to the point of our analysis is the …nding by Agarwal and Ray (2012) that returns are negative (signi…cantly or not, depending on the test design) in the …rst six months after the introduction of a HWM, a period that corresponds roughly to the …rst period of our model. Combined with the negative result for the unconditional e¤ect of the HWM on returns, this bears out the prediction that investors buy the chance at a positive future expected return with a negative initial expected return. They also …nd that returns before the HWM introduction are abnormally high, which is at least in the direction of the prediction that the HWM adds value only for managers whose skill is close to certain.
In Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003), one of the main empirical …ndings is that, subsequent to good performance, small funds grow and large funds shrink. This does not address the predictions of our model but it is worth noting, as it is consistent with the large funds, but not small funds, being in the in ‡ow region, which is where the e¢ ciency of the HWM is relatively high. The assumption of decreasing returns to scale and competitive capital markets in hedge funds was recently tested by Naik, Ramadorai and Stromqvist (2007) and Fung, Hsieh, Naik and Ramadorai (2008), who conclude that the e¤ect is strong in recent years, and weaker in earlier years.
IV. Concluding Remarks
The HWM governs the fees of many funds, which hold a large portion of managed wealth, so it is important to understand both why it exists and what it does. The literature to date has explored the HWM along several dimensions, but has simpli…ed the analysis to that of one investment that might eventually leave. In this paper we expand the analysis to that of a fund that not only lets money out but takes it in as well. Because the HWM applies at the investment level, this can di¤erentiate the expected fees, and thus expected returns, of the investors within the fund, and we …nd this di¤erentiation to be key to the role of the HWM. Most notably, to those entering the fund of a wellknown manager, it o¤ers the prospect of rents after bad performance, and it does this by shielding incumbent investors from the willingness of new investment to compete its own rents to zero. To those entering the fund of a rookie manager, the HWM means little, mainly because the much-worse prospects after bad performance mean there are no rents to shield. Thus, the e¤ects of the HWM include distortions of the time series and cross section of funds'returns, and also of their assets under management, where the crucial distinction between funds is not the alphas investors initially ascribe to the managers, but the precisions of these alphas.
We analyze performance of HWM in mitigating the perverse e¤ects of adverse selection and moral hazard. We address adverse selection by allowing managers to be skilled or unskilled, where the skilled managers can try to reveal themselves through the contracts they o¤er. The HWM, we …nd, does not help solve this problem, because the unskilled is always better o¤ choosing to o¤er whatever contract the skilled o¤er, whether it includes a HWM or not. We also address moral hazard by requiring a privately costly e¤ort to turn skill into value, and while we …nd that the HWM can reward e¤ort, in the sense of increasing the maximum cost managers will pay, we also …nd that the parameter region where this increase occurs is unlikely to obtain in practice. For the HWM to add value by alleviating moral hazard, investors would have to put a very high prior probability on the manager being skilled.
If the HWM is so little help against adverse selection and moral hazard, then what problem, if any, does it address? One possibility raised by our analysis is that it accelerates the compensation of experienced managers, which might be Pareto improving if the manager is less patient than the investors. That is, with the HWM, the manager e¤ec-tively sells an above-market return in certain future states, and enjoys the sale proceeds immediately through the increased base fee it brings in. Since experienced managers would tend to be older, and since many investors are patient capital pools such as endowments, this acceleration could be a welfare-increasing trade. Whether this or some other rationale explains the popularity of the HWM is an interesting area for empirical research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: First, suppose that such a separating equilibrium exists.
Then there must exist a pair of contracts (x; y; d) 6 = (x; y; d) 0 such that type G o¤ers (x; y; d) and type B o¤ers (x; y; d) 0 . Recall that a manager must extract the entire expected surplus at date 0 in equilibrium. So in a separating equilibrium the expected payo¤s are 2 (2 1) c and maxf2 (2 1) ; 0g for types G and B, respectively.
Next, we check for deviations by type B. If type B deviates and o¤ers (x; y; d) then the investors believe that the manager's type is G with probability 1. If instead the investors had believed that the manager's type had been B with probability 1, then the expected payo¤ of a type B manager would have been 2 (2 1) under the (x; y; d)
contract. Note that for a given contract the initial fund size is strictly greater and the second period's fund size is weakly greater when investors assign higher probabilities to type G, so type B's expected payo¤ is strictly greater than 2 (2 1) when he deviates and o¤ers (x; y; d). Therefore, there does not exist an e¢ cient separating equilibrium.
A similar argument rules out a partially separating equilibrium as well.
Proof of Proposition 2:
We have already shown that b I 0 = I 0 in the out ‡ow region, and since in this region investors break even in the …rst period and must withdraw investment to break even after a low return, it follows that their initial investment is too high to break even overall without withdrawing. Thus in the out ‡ow region, it must be true that I S 0 < I 0 . For the other direction, note that if I S 0 < I 0 then investors will not invest more than I 0 in the …rst period, since that way their expected return is negative in the …rst period and zero in the second, since they will have to withdraw money after a low return just to break even. And they will not invest less than I 0 because then it is pro…table to invest for just the …rst period. So they invest I 0 and then withdraw some investment after a low return. 
which is strictly greater than I 0 . To calculate the expected second-period return after a low return, plug I F 0 into the expected second-period return, i.e. x[(1 x)I
For the overall expected return to be zero, the expected …rst-period return must be 
For the overall expected return to be zero, the expected …rst-period return must be (1 0 ) times this number, therefore it is strictly less than zero.
Proof of Proposition 5: First we assume that such an equilibrium exists and use Bayesian updating on the equilibrium path. Next, we write down the incentive compatibility condition for type G making the costly e¤ort.
Simplifying terms lead to
Further simplifying we have
Solving for the cuto¤ cost, c, we have
Next, we characterize the equilibrium and check for deviations. In equilibrium, type . The manager receives xI 0 and xI 0 + y ( xI 0 ) after a low and high return respectively. The investors update their beliefs to L and H , and invest a total amount of I
and I
following low and high return respectively. The second-period returns are realized and managers receive xI 1 and xI 1 + y ( xI 1 ) after a low and high return, respectively. For complete characterization of the entire parameter space, we impose the o¤ the equilibrium path beliefs that allow us to support the largest set of equilibria. In particular, we complete the characterization with the following: if the manager o¤ers any other contract, (x 0 ; y 0 ; d 0 ), investors believe that manager's type is B.
Given these beliefs, if 1 2 y 0 then deviation leads to zero total fees since the fund size is zero in both periods. So deviation may be pro…table only if > 1 2 y 0 . Given that there is no updating, if the second period fund size is positive, the …rst period fund size is also positive. Note that the expected total fee for type B is equal to 2 (2 1).
Recall that type B would have made the same amount under the equilibrium contract (x; y; d = 0) if the investors assign probability 1 to having type B. Therefore, the equilibrium payo¤ has to be higher for type B given that the beliefs put strictly higher probability on type G on the equilibrium path. Consequently type B cannot deviate pro…tably. Similarly, one can verify that there is no pro…table deviation for type G at the o¤er stage,either. Finally, by the de…nition of c a deviation by type G is not pro…table at the e¤ort stage as long as c c.
Proof of Proposition 6:
The proof is omitted to avoid repetition.
Proof of Proposition 7:As discussed in the previous section, the HWM increases the initial fund size in the In ‡ow Region, i.e., b I 0 > I 0 . The expected second-period cost of the HWM (in terms of loss of incentive fee) for the manager, and conversely, the second-period gain for incumbent investors, is
> 0, where
; 1g (note that r is the fraction the fund's second period assets that incumbent investment represents). To o¤set the second-period expected bene…t with greater …rst-period fees, the fund is larger at date 0 with the HWM, i.e. b I 0 > I 0 . Let
There are two channels through which compensation is a¤ected.
First, higher fund size leads to higher base fees which leads to equally higher payo¤s for both types B and G in comparison to the no-HWM case. Second, higher base fees, x b I 0 , means smaller incentive fees, 0 y x b I 0 . Therefore, due to the HWM expected compensation in the initial period increases by x I 0 0 yx I 0 which can be rewritten as x I 0 (1 0 y). This higher payo¤ for the manager in the …rst period is not equally shared by both types. Smaller incentive fees a¤ect type G more negatively since yx I 0 > yx I 0 . Therefore, type B expects to bene…t more in the initial period due to the HWM.
Both types pay in the second period for their extra compensation in the …rst: the net expected gain in …rst period, x I 0 (1 0 y), has to equal to the net expected loss of incentive fees in the second period, (1 0 ) L ry xI L 1 . Furthermore, the zero expected compensation change implies that
which can be rearranged to ry xI
Since the expected e¤ect of the HWM on compensation depends on realized returns, it varies across the types. For type G, the expected second-period cost of the HWM is , so if + < 1, we must have 1
Thus, if + < 1, then type G has a higher expected second-period cost due to HWM.
Recall that type G also has a lower expected bene…t in the …rst period. Since there is zero net expected gain across periods and types, the HWM must make type G worse o¤, and type B better o¤, when + < 1. So the expected compensation di¤erence between the types is smaller, and consequently there is less incentive for type G to make the costly e¤ort.
On the other hand, if + > 1, then > maxf1 ; g and minf1 ; g > 1 ,
Consequently, if + > 1, then the HWM may make type G better o¤ as long as
Using ry
Simpli…cation of the left hand side leads to
y:
, and further simplifying results in
asdf.
Proof of Proposition 8:
In the Out ‡ow Region, with the HWM incumbent investors withdraw funds after a low return until they break even in expectation. Given that incumbent investors break even in the second period, the initial fund size is identical to the case without HWM, I 0 . The second period fund size following a low return in the …rst period depends on the amount of the incentive fee paid in the second period. In the case of high returns in the second period, if the net pro…t, xI 1 , is greater than prorated loss in the …rst period,
( + xI 0 ), then the excess pro…t,
( + xI 0 ), pays incentive fee. Otherwise, no incentive fee will be paid. In either case, the incentive fee paid is less than the case without HWM. Let q stand for the fraction of incentive fee reduction in the second period due to HWM.
Lower incentive fee leads to higher fund size in the second period. Therefore, HWM results in higher fund size following a low return.
The expected additional compensation (in comparison to no HWM) due to higher fund size is therefore
However, given that there will be net zero compensation increase, the expected cost which is the expected cost of HWM in terms of lost incentive, has to equal
Rewriting this condition leads to y xI
Type G and type B do not share these costs and bene…ts equally. The expected bene…t for type G and type B are (1 )x I 1 and (1 )x I 1 , respectively. Similarly, the expected cost for type G and type B are (1 ) y xI
Given that > L this term is strictly negative. Therefore, type G is strictly worse o¤ due to HWM in the out ‡ow case. .
Proof of Proposition 9:
In what follows we will characterize the condition for HWM to increase the e¢ ciency. First, note that both I 1 and I 0 are positive and there is no incentive pay in the second period following a …rst period low return. Therefore, zero compensation increase due to HWM implies
Rewriting this condition leads to
Similar to the in ‡ow case, HWM may make type G better o¤ as long as we have
, the above inequality becomes
Note that we have I 0 = 
) and L =
(1 ) (1 )+ (1 )(1 ) into (2) leads to the characterization of the condition that is necessary for HWM to increase e¢ ciency. This picture plots the optimal initial asset size of a fund with and without a high-water mark. The x-axis 0 L can be interpreted as a measure of precision with larger values corresponding to greater imprecision. In this example, 0 is …xed and measures the probability of a good return in the …rst period while L updates according to Bayes Rule and is the probability of a good outcome in the second period after observing bad performance in the …rst period. From the model, this implies that ranges from 0.66 to 1 and takes a corresponding value such that 0 is always 0.797. The remaining parameters are = 0:5; x = 0:02; y = 0:2;and = 100: Figure 2 . Expected returns in the …rst period and after poor performance for a fund with a high-water mark. The x-axis 0 L can be interpreted as a measure of precision with larger values corresponding to greater imprecision. In this example, 0 is …xed and measures the probability of a good return in the …rst period while L updates according to Bayes Rule and is the probability of a good outcome in the second period after observing bad performance in the …rst period. From the model, this implies that ranges from 0.66 to 1 and takes a corresponding value such that 0 is always 0.797. The remaining parameters are = 0:5; x = 0:02; y = 0:2;and = 100: Figure 3 . Optimal asset size after poor performance for a fund with and without highwater marks. The x-axis 0 L can be interpreted as a measure of precision with larger values corresponding to greater imprecision. In this example, 0 is …xed and measures the probability of a good return in the …rst period while L updates according to Bayes Rule and is the probability of a good outcome in the second period after observing bad performance in the …rst period. From the model, this implies that ranges from 0.66 to 1 and takes a corresponding value such that 0 is always 0.797. The remaining parameters are = 0:5; x = 0:02; y = 0:2;and = 100: Figure 4 . Net ‡ows after poor performance for funds with and without high-water marks. Flows are de…ned as a percent of the assets realized after returns and expenses at the beginning of the second period before new in ‡ows or out ‡ows occur. The x-axis 0 L can be interpreted as a measure of precision with larger values corresponding to greater imprecision. In this example, 0 is …xed and measures the probability of a good return in the …rst period while L updates according to Bayes Rule and is the probability of a good outcome in the second period after observing bad performance in the …rst period. From the model, this implies that ranges from 0.66 to 1 and takes a corresponding value such that 0 is always 0.797. The remaining parameters are = 0:5; x = 0:02; y = 0:2;and = 100: Figure 5 . Net ‡ows after good performance for funds with and without high-water marks. Flows are de…ned as a percent of the assets realized after returns and expenses at the beginning of the second period before new in ‡ows or out ‡ows occur. The x-axis 0 L can be interpreted as a measure of precision with larger values corresponding to greater imprecision. In this example, 0 is …xed and measures the probability of a good return in the …rst period while L updates according to Bayes Rule and is the probability of a good outcome in the second period after observing bad performance in the …rst period. From the model, this implies that ranges from 0.66 to 1 and takes a corresponding value such that 0 is always 0.797. The remaining parameters are = 0:5; x = 0:02; y = 0:2;and = 100: 
